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RETHINKING THE RULE OF REASON: FROM
PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS TO NCAA
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,1 the
Supreme Court struck down an association's canon of ethics on antitrust
grounds. In retrospect, the invalidation of a canon of ethics prohibiting
competitive bidding for engineering work seems unremarkable and
clearly correct.2 The importance of the opinion lies in its reformulation
of the rule of reason, the traditional means of evaluating an alleged
restraint of trade under the antitrust laws. With broad language, the
Court presented an unqualified defense of competition, foreclosed
consideration of factors other than the restraint's impact on competition,
and reduced the rule of reason inquiry to "whether the challenged
agreement is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses
competition."'3
A rule of reason that is solely concerned with balancing the
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of an agreement lends itself to
the majority of commercial arrangements. There are, however, a number
of areas where this rule of reason lacks the flexibility necessary to deal
with atypical situations and entities.4  This note will review the
Professional Engineers decision and discuss three areas of difficulty
encountered by the lower courts in attempting to apply the rule of reason
as set out in Professional Engineers.
In the first of these areas, the lower courts have rigidly applied
Professional Engineers to reach results that are analytically confusing and
undesirable when taken to their logical conclusion. A typical case
exhibiting this rigid approach is an antitrust challenge to the National
Football League's player draft.5 The second situation finds the lower
courts ignoring the Professional Engineers formulation of the rule of
reason in favor of a different standard because of problems associated
with applying the Professional Engineers test. Illustrating this avoidance
1. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
2. Much of the initial novelty of the decision concerned the application of the antitrust laws to
the learned professions. See infra note 20. Absent these considerations, holding an entire industry's
outright ban on competitive bidding unlawful is not a surprising result.
3. Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 691.
4. For commentators noting the excessive rigidity of Professional Engineers, see Handler,
Antitrust-1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1374-75 (1978); Robinson, Recent Antitrust
Developments-1979, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16-19 (1980); Zelek, Stern & Dunfee, A Rule of Reason
Decision Model After Sylvania, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 13, 38-41 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Zelek].
5. See infra notes 37-73 and accompanying text.
1297
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
of the Professional Engineers approach are cases involving antitrust
challenges to the practices of sports associations.6 Finally, the lower
courts have struggled to adapt the Professional Engineers rule of reason
to situations not lending themselves to such a test. This has resulted in a
strained attempt to force the cases into the Professional Engineers
formula and in the application of tests not wholly consistent with
Professional Engineers. Cases involving antitrust challenges to hospital
staff privilege decisions illustrate this aspect of the problem. 7
After exploring these difficulties, this note will suggest alternative
methods of analysis to rectify them.8 These alternatives are based on
aspects of the Professional Engineers decision that are not prominent in
the opinion. Primary among these is the possibility of using an ancillary
restraint test that assesses whether the challenged restraint is narrowly
tailored to obtain acceptable ends. The Supreme Court's recent decision
in NCAA v. Board of Regents 9 took faltering steps toward adoption of
such an ancillary restraint test, but ultimately did not utilize the
opportunity to clarify the scope of the rule of reason as applied to
atypical situations.10
I. NATIONAL SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS
V. UNITED STATES
The basic problem in interpreting and administering the Sherman
Act is that it cannot mean what it literally says. Section 1 of the statute
purports to outlaw every contract that restrains trade or commerce.11
Read literally, the statute would abrogate all of private contract law, for,
as Justice Brandeis observed early in the process of interpreting the Act,
"[e]very agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.
To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence."12
The courts were therefore left the task of giving shape to the broad
6. See infra notes 74-94 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 95-117 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 118-41 and accompanying text.
9. 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
10. See infra notes 142-93 and accompanying text.
11. Section I of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
12. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see also Professional
Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 687-88 ("restraint is the very essence of every contract").
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mandate of the Sherman Act.13 The rule of reason is the tool that has
traditionally been employed to give the Act definition and flexibility.' 4
Not every contract restraining trade is unlawful, but only those "unrea-
sonably restrictive of competitive conditions."' 15 In evaluating a chal-
lenged agreement under the rule of reason, the courts have long been
directed to analyze "the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the
restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed"' 16 to determine whether
competition is unreasonably restrained.
The Supreme Court's most recent examination of the proper consid-
erations under the rule of reason is its 1978 decision, National Society of
Professional Engineers v. United States. 17 As part of its code of ethics,
the National Society of Professional Engineers adopted a canon prohibit-
ing the submission or solicitation of engineering proposals on the basis of
competitive bidding.' 8 An engineer was not to discuss or negotiate the
question of fees until after a prospective client had selected him for a
particular project. 9 The United States brought a civil antitrust action
challenging the association's canon prohibiting competitive bidding. 20
The society attempted to justify its canon by arguing that the restric-
tion on competitive bidding was reasonable because competition among
13. Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 688 (legislative history of Sherman Act indicates Congress
expected the courts to fill in the contours of the statute (citing 21 Cong. Rec. 2456 (1890) (comments
of Sen. Sherman))).
14. See id.
15. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911) (emphasis added).
16. Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692; see Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S.
231, 238 (1918).
17. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
18. Id. at 683 n.3.
19. Id. at 682.
20. While it was at one time thought that the antitrust laws did not apply to the learned profes-
sions, the Supreme Court put the so-called learned profession exemption to rest in Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 793 (1975) (local bar association's "minimum fee schedule" for title
examination violates section 1 of Sherman Act). In so doing, the Court noted that professional prac-
tices may still be subject to a somewhat different antitrust analysis than ordinary business activities.
The now famous footnote 17 in Goldfarb provides:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business is, of
course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman Act.
It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other
business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust concepts which
originated in other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the professions,
may require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the
Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently.
Id. at 788 n.17.
Professional Engineers is notable for its statement that this cautionary note in Goldfarb "cannot
be read as fashioning a broad exemption under the Rule of Reason for learned professions." 435
U.S. at 696. The Court made it clear that a total ban on competitive bidding and price information
is no more defensible in the professional context than it would be in the commercial context.
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engineers is contrary to the public interest. 21 It claimed that competitive
pressure to offer engineering services at the lowest possible price would
adversely affect the quality of engineering and would therefore be danger-
ous to public health, safety, and welfare. 22 The Court rejected this de-
fense as resting on a fundamental misunderstanding of the rule of
reason. 23 In response, the Court undertook a review and reformulation
of the rule of reason. Certain practices are so plainly anticompetitive
that they are condemned as illegal per se without an elaborate study of
the industry.24 Practices falling into this category include price fixing,
market division among competitors, tying arrangements, and group boy-
cotts. 25 Practices not subject to per se condemnation are evaluated under
the rule of reason.
The Court noted that, contrary to its name, the rule of reason does
not open the antitrust inquiry to defense of a challenged restraint simply
on grounds that it falls within the realm of reason.26 It is not enough
that some argument can be made that a restraint is desirable. Instead,
the rule of reason analysis must focus on the restraint's impact on com-
petition.27 The Court thoroughly rejected the society's defense that its
restraint was reasonable because competition among engineers is con-
trary to the public interest. 28 It emphasized that the Sherman Act is
premised on a belief that competition is the preferred means of allocating
resources. 29 The Court bluntly concluded that "the Rule of Reason does
not support a defense based on the assumption that competition itself is
unreasonable. ' 30 Courts may not entertain arguments that monopolistic
arrangements are preferable to competition because of the special charac-
teristics of a particular industry.31 Any industry believing competition to
21. Professor Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 684.
22. Id. at 685.
23. Id. at 681.
24. Id. at 692. The per se rule is viewed as a judicial shortcut. See Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1981). It is applied to practices whose effects on competition
are so pernicious, so plainly anticompetitive and lacking in redeeming virtue, that they will be con-
demned on their face. See Professional Eng',s, 435 U.S. at 692; Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). When it is determined that the per se rule is applicable, no further inquiry is
made, and no justification for the restraint will be heard. See Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 351.
25. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 n.15 (1981). Whether a
particular practice falls within one of these categories is often not easily determined and is the sub-
ject of frequent litigation. See, e.g., id. at 336-37; Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 4 (1978);
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 (1977).
26. Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 688.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 693-95.
29. Id. at 695.
30. Id. at 696.
31. Id. at 689.
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be unsuitable to it was directed to petition Congress for an exemption to
the Sherman Act.32
In the Court's words, "the inquiry mandated by the Rule of Reason
is whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or
one that suppresses competition. ' 33 The rule of reason test called for in
Professional Engineers apparently requires a court to balance the
procompetitive effects of a challenged agreement against its anticompeti-
tive effects to determine which predominates. 34 No factor other than the
restraint's effect on competition may be considered and only restraints
with a net procompetitive effect are permissible. 35
II. APPLICATION OF THE PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS RULE OF
REASON
Professional Engineers' call to focus solely on a balancing of
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects in the rule of reason analysis
causes problems in several contexts. These problems often arise when
the practice challenged on antitrust grounds is intended primarily, or at
least partially, to effect noneconomic goals. The party attempting to de-
fend an agreement or practice by pointing to the achievement of these
noneconomic goals is confronted with Professional Engineers' admoni-
tion that only benefits to competition can be considered to offset a re-
straint of trade.
Applying the rule of reason, as articulated in Professional Engineers,
also proves troublesome when entities with unusual characteristics are
involved. This can occur when the entity is largely self-regulating or
when the model of free competition does not apply to the entity in-
32. Id. at 689-90.
33. Id. at 691.
34. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978). As one com-
mentator has described the Professional Engineers test, the restraint must be "output expanding"
rather than "output restricting." Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, Antitrust and Hospital Privi-
leges: Testing the Conventional Wisdom, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 646 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Kissan & Webber] (citing Elzinga, The Compass of Competition for Professional Services, in REGU-
LATING THE PROFESSIONS 107 (R. Blair & S. Rubin eds. 1980)).
35. Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Rehnquist joined, concurred in the judgment, but
would not have reached as far as the Court in intimating that any ethical rule with a net anticompeti-
tive effect is forbidden. Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 699. He noted that the case did not require
the Court to decide whether the rule of reason could ever take account of benefits other than in-
creased competition. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). Of concern to him was the
fact that there may be ethical rules that have more than a de minimis anticompetitive effect yet are
important and necessary. Id. at 700. Examples given were a medical association's standards of
minimum competency for licensing or a bar association's regulation of certain advertising or in-
person solicitation. Id. at 700-01. Justice Blackmun felt that the approach indicated in the Goldfarb
footnote, see supra note 20, left the Court enough flexibility to deal with such situations. Id. at 699.
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volved. 36 The lower courts have found it difficult to fit these situations
within the rule of reason framework mandated by Professional Engineers.
A. Rigid Application of Professional Engineers.
An early example of a court grappling with the Professional Engi-
neers rule of reason is Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.37 Smith involved an
antitrust challenge to the National Football League (NFL) player selec-
tion system, or draft. The draft is the means by which negotiation rights
to graduating college football players are allocated among the NFL
clubs. It is one of the various mechanisms employed by the league to
limit the movement of players between teams. 38 The draft is designed to
promote competitive balance between the teams in the league by dispers-
ing new player talent.39 The weaker teams have a selection preference as
selections are made in reverse order of the prior year's standings. 40 The
goal is to have evenly matched teams, in the hope of creating closer
games, tight pennant races, and the uncertainty of outcome that makes
for spectator interest.4
36. The Sherman Act is premised on the belief that competition is the best method of allocating
resources and that the free market, operating without restraint, will ultimately produce lower prices
and better goods and services. See id. at 695. This view is consistent with analyzing an agreement to
determine whether it promotes or suppresses competition. Id. at 691. This model of market compe-
tition is, however, not always applicable. For instance, a large law firm may have several branch
offices. We would not expect each office to compete against the others in the market to hire graduat-
ing law students, but would anticipate a coordinated recruiting strategy. This could well involve an
agreement that each office will pay the same starting salary, rather than bid against each other. If a
number of separate law firms came to such an agreement, there would be little hesitancy in finding
such an agreement to constitute price fixing. The same agreement, solely among branches of the
same firm, would merely entail fixing the firm's starting salary. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX 265 (1978); see also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (when two part-
ners set the price of the goods they sell they are literally price fixing, but it is not per se illegal);
Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as a Single Entity Under Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1983) (noting
absurdity of hypothetical action by young attorney alleging that the partners of his law firm con-
spired to fix associate's salaries in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act by not allowing depart-
ments within the firm to bid for associate's services). This basic premise, that the entities involved
are competitors, goes unstated in Professional Engineers.
Between the extremes of free market competitors and branches of a single entity lie variant
entities. These entities consist of separate, individual components that must cooperate in order to
function and produce a joint product. Applying the Professional Engineers rule of reason to such
entities has proven troublesome and is the focus of much of this note.
37. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
38. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.03 (1979).
39. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1175.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1176. Most commentators recognize that the success of a league sports venture de-
pends upon the unpredictability of the outcome. See, e.g., J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note
38, § 5.07, at 595-96.
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Under the version of the draft challenged by Smith,42 only one team
* could select any particular college player. If a player could not reach a
contract agreement with that team, he could not play in the NFL at all.43
The district court held the draft to be illegal per se.44 The court found
that the draft's restrictions were " 'naked restraints of trade with no pur-
pose except stifling of competition.' -45 In the alternative, the court held
that the draft would also be unlawful if judged under the rule of reason.46
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit took a
more tolerant view of the draft, rejecting the district court's conclusion
that the draft was illegal per se.47 Several reasons were advanced for this
conclusion. The court noted that the NFL clubs operate in some re-
spects like a joint venture to deliver a product that could not be produced
without agreement and joint action. 48 Courts have consistently refused
to invoke the per se rule where the peculiar characteristics of an industry
necessitate cooperation and concerted activity. 49 The court emphasized
that the draft could not properly be characterized as having "no purpose
except stifling of competition." 50 Some form of player selection system
might be needed to regulate competition in what would otherwise be a
chaotic bidding market for college players.5 1 Considerable evidence was
also presented by the NFL to show that the draft was designed to, and
did, contribute to preserving playing-field equality among the NFL
clubs.52 Further, the court noted that a draft was widely used in all ma-
jor professional sports and had both judicial and scholarly support for its
economic usefulness.5 3
After deciding that the rule of reason was appropriate, the court
undertook to apply it. The court looked to the test it believed was
42. As a result of collective bargaining with the players, the league has made several modifica-
tions to the draft system subsequent to Smith's suit. See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1176 n.6.
43. Id. at 1187.
44. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 744-45 (D.D.C. 1976), afd in part and rev'd
in part, 593 F.2d 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1978). For an explanation of the role of the per se rule in antitrust
analysis, see supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
45. Smith, 420 F. Supp. at 745 (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263
(1963)).
46. Id.
47. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1178.
48. Id. at 1179.
49. Id. at 1180; see NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2961 (1984); Hatley v. Ameri-
can Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1977); Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v.
National Bank-Americard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119, 126, 128 n.7 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
918 (1974).
50. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1181.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1182.
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enunciated in Professional Engineers: a balancing of the anticompetitive
evils of the challenged practice against its procompetitive virtues.54 If
the net effect of the restraint was to impede competition, it would be held
to be unreasonable.55
The court had no difficulty in ascertaining the relevant anticompeti-
tive evils. The draft restricted competition among NFL clubs for the
services of college players.5 6 Indeed, that was its purpose. It forced each
seller of such services to deal with only one buyer, removing the seller's
bargaining power.57 The court found that the effect of this was to lower
the salary levels of graduating college players.5 8
The court then turned to the NFL's justification for the draft. Be-
cause it had already recognized the special needs of the industry and the
value of a draft in promoting those needs,5 9 one would think that the
court might give weight to these factors under the rule of reason. The
court, however, believed that the virtues of the draft, enumerated and
considered in refusing to apply the per se rule, could no longer be taken
into account under the rule of reason because they did not promote eco-
nomic competition.60
In the court's view competitive balance and playing-field equality
among the teams may heighten athletic competition, and therefore have a
"procompetitive" effect on the playing field, but this does not increase
competition in the economic sense.61 The court noted that competition
would not be increased in the sense of increased market entry or lower
prices. 62 Illustrative of its inability to fit the facts of this case into the
Professional Engineers framework is the court's statement that because
"the draft's 'anticompetitive' and 'procompetitive' effects are not com-
parable, it is impossible to 'net them out' in the usual rule-of-reason bal-
ancing."'63 The court stated that in "strict economic terms, the draft's
demonstrated procompetitive effects are nil." 64 With nothing of procom-
petitive virtue to balance, "the outcome is plain," and the draft was held
54. Id. at 1183.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1185.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1186.
59. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
60. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1186; see Robinson, supra note 4, at 20-22 (noting absurdity of consider-
ing draft's virtues in order to avoid per se condemnation only to foreclose such factors from rule of
reason analysis).
61. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1186.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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to violate the rule of reason.65 Thus, the court had reached the anoma-
lous result that the league's justification for the draft was taken into ac-
count in refusing to apply the per se rule, but could not be considered
under the rule of reason.66
The inconsistency of the court's analysis is highlighted by its discus-
sion of less restrictive forms of player draft that might be acceptable.
The league's need for some form of player draft was not entirely lost on
the court. It noted that this case involved what amounted to a "total
ban" on competition, 67 but suggested several significantly less anticompe-
titive versions of a draft system, 68 although purporting not to intimate
any view as to their legality. 69 The court seemed to believe that some less
restrictive form of draft system was capable of withstanding antitrust
scrutiny. 70
The court's proposals, however, fail to withstand its own rule of rea-
son analysis. Any less restrictive draft would still limit the ability of cer-
tain players to contract with certain teams. An anticompetitive effect
would clearly exist. The justification for a draft system, even a less
restrictive one, would remain the league's need for competitive balance.
According to the court, however, a competitive balance justification
cannot be considered because it is not an economically procompetitive
justification. 71 The result of such an analysis is the condemnation of any
form of player draft.72  The court had thus painted itself into an
65. Id. at 1187.
66. See Robinson, supra note 4, at 20-22.
67. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1187.
68. The court suggested allowing more than one team to draft a player, holding a second yearly
draft for players unable to reach agreement with the first drafting club, or subjecting only the best
college players to the draft. Id. at 1188.
69. Id. at 1187.
70. See also Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976) (reasonable
restrictions relating to player transfers may be necessary for successful operation of the league; every
restraint on competition for player services not necessarily violative of antitrust laws), cert. dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 38, § 5.07, at 622-25 (reason-
able accommodation of competing concerns likely to involve some restraints on player mobility).
71. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1186; see supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
72. Despite the decision in Smith, the NFL still employs a player draft. The player draft, and
other restrictions on player mobility, have been agreed to by the NFL player's union and incorpo-
rated into the collective bargaining agreement between the league and the union. See Alexander v.
National Football League, 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) t 61,730, at 72,985, 72,997 (D. Minn.), aff'd
sub nom. Reynolds v. National Football League, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978). The draft exists
today because player restraints are incorporated into a labor agreement as a result of good faith,
arm's length bargaining, and are therefore exempt from the antitrust laws under the nonstatutory
labor exemption. See McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1203 (6th Cir. 1979); see
also Weistart, Judicial Review of Labor Agreements: Lessons From the Sports Industry, 44 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 109-33 (1981) (historical overview of labor exemption in context of sports
antitrust litigation). For general background on the nonstatutory labor exemption, see J. WEISTART
& C. LOWELL, supra note 38, § 5.04.
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analytical corner, conceding the league's valid interest in competitive bal-
ance, but precluding any consideration of this factor in the rule of reason
analysis. 73
B. Ignoring the Professional Engineers Approach: The Exclusionary
Practices of Sports Associations.
In a wide variety of situations, associations that govern, regulate,
and promote particular activities make determinations that affect the eli-
gibility of participants and acceptability of equipment. 74 Examples of as-
sociation decisions recently subjected to litigation include a tennis
association's refusal to sanction a new type of racket 75 and an associa-
tion's refusal to register a horse because its markings did not conform to
The fact that restraints to which a union has agreed may be exempt from the antitrust laws does
not moot the significance of the discussion of the Smith case. The basic difficulty in applying the
Professional Engineers competitive balancing test remains. Further, the point is not moot even as to
a player draft. The recently formed United States Football League (USFL) conducts a player draft.
There is no collective bargaining agreement in the USFL to insulate the player draft from antitrust
attack. The USFL could conceivably face litigation very similar to the Smith case in the near future.
73. Prior to Professional Engineers, several antitrust actions had been brought challenging
sports league practices tending to restrict the mobility of players. See, e.g., Mackey v. National
Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). In Mackey, a
player challenged the NFL's Rozelle Rule. The Rozelle Rule, or free agent compensation scheme,
was a system whereby the league commissioner would award compensation to the team losing a
player whose contract term had expired. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 38, § 5.03, at
502-03. The compensation came from the team signing the free agent and would typically consist of
draft choices and/or players from the signing team's roster. Id. The presence of the Rozelle Rule
drastically inhibited bidding for the services of free agents. Id. at 503.
Mackey brought an antitrust challenge to the Rozelle Rule. The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that the per se rule would not be applied and turned to a rule of reason analysis.
Mackey, 543 F.2d at 619-20. Unencumbered by the Professional Engineers opinion, the test applied
was whether the restraint was justified by legitimate business purposes and no more restrictive than
necessary. Id. at 620. The court found that the league had a legitimate business interest in maintain-
ing competitive balance between the teams in the league. Id. at 621. The Rozelle Rule was nonethe-
less invalidated because it was more restrictive than necessary to serve this legitimate goal. Id. at
622. This approach left room for the possibility that the league could employ less restrictive means
to limit player movement without violating the antitrust laws. Id. at 623.
This analysis should be compared to that employed in the Smith case. Because of Professional
Engineers, the Smith court felt unable to give weight to the league's business justifications for the
player draft under the rule of reason. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text. This left the
court in an analytical bind. The draft in question amounted to a "total ban" on competition, and
therefore would have been held unlawful under either the Mackey or Smith approach. However,
when the Smith court suggested less restrictive versions of the draft in order to meet the NFL's
legitimate business needs, it did so in the face of a rule of reason analysis that could not uphold any
form of player draft because of a complete lack of procompetitive benefits. See supra notes 67-72 and
accompanying text.
74. See generally J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 38, § 5.10.
75. Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 1103 (D. Neb.), aff'd
per curiam, 665 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1981).
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specifications. 76 In such cases, the disappointed applicant or manufac-
turer may challenge the exclusion on antitrust grounds.77 Similar issues
are raised when a previously eligible participant is declared ineligible for
reasons of misconduct.78 Courts faced with these challenges have gener-
ally refused to apply the per se rule79 because, by definition, the activities
require collective action and rulemaking. Further, the rules in question
are typically not naked restraints of trade with no redeeming virtue, but
are obviously intended to effect some other valid goal.
Thus, these sports association practices have been evaluated under
the rule of reason when challenged on antitrust grounds. The question is
how the rule of reason analysis should proceed. Professional Engineers
apparently requires a balancing of procompetitive and anticompetitive
effects. The cases involving sports association regulations have not taken
this approach, nor have they explained the failure to do so. Instead, the
cases apply a test deemed appropriate for industries where a need for self-
regulation is apparent.80 This inquiry focuses on:
(1) whether the collective action is intended to accomplish an end con-
sistent with the policy justifying self-regulation; (2) whether the action
is reasonably related to that goal; (3) whether such action is no more
extensive than necessary; and (4) whether the association provides pro-
cedural safeguards which assure that the restraint is not arbitrary and
which furnish a basis for judicial review. 81
76. Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1977).
77. See, e.g., Bridge Corp. of Am. v. American Contract Bridge League, Inc., 428 F.2d 1365,
1365-66 (9th Cir. 1970) (sanctioning organization refused to allow use of new computer system for
scoring bridge tournaments), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 940 (1971); Deesen v. Professional Golfers Ass'n,
358 F.2d 165, 166 (9th Cir.) (golfer denied eligibility to play in PGA tournaments), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 846 (1966); STP Corp. v. United States Auto Club, 286 F. Supp. 146, 149 (S.D. Ind. 1968)
(sanctioning organization guidelines excluding certain turbine powered cars).
78. See, e.g., Cokin v. American Contract Bridge League, Inc., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,367 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (bridge player expelled for improper prearranged communications); Cooney
v. American Horse Shows Ass'n, 495 F. Supp. 424, 426-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (horse trainer suspended
when horse found to have been drugged).
79. See Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 652 (5th Cir. 1977); Gunter
Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 1103, 1115-16 (D. Neb.), aff'd per
curiam, 665 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1981).
80. See Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 1103, 1116 (D.
Neb.), aff'd per curiam, 665 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1981). This line of reasoning is more or less derived
from Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963). See Gunter Harz Sports, 511 F. Supp. at
1116.
81. Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 1103, 1116 (D. Neb.
1981); see also United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781, 790 (7th Cir.
1981) (test will be whether the challenged conduct went beyond the level of restraint reasonably
necessary to accomplish whatever legitimate business purpose is asserted for it); J. WEisTART & C.
LOWELL, supra note 38, § 5.10, at 670-71 (activities of sports associations scrutinized by examining
purpose of rule in question, whether rule is proper means of achieving justifiable end, and procedural
aspects of activity).
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A recent case illustrates the difference between these two ap-
proaches. In Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Associa-
tion,82 a manufacturer of "double-strung" tennis rackets brought an
antitrust challenge to the International Tennis Federation's rule defining
tennis rackets in such a way as to exclude double-strung rackets. 83 The
rule, adopted after considerable study of the effect such rackets would
have on the game of tennis,84 was intended to eliminate rackets that place
undue spin on the ball. A qualifying procedure was specified by which
rackets that did not meet the letter of the rule could still be approved if
they did not materially alter the flight of, or add significant spin to, the
ball.85
The court rejected a holding of per se illegality and concluded that
the rule of reason should be employed. 86 It then applied the four-part
test set out above. 87 The court found that the goal of preserving the
essential character and integrity of the game of tennis as it had always
been played was a legitimate goal for the association to adopt.8 8 The
racket rule in question was reasonably related to that goal.8 9 The evi-
dence supported the association's belief that double-strung rackets could
fundamentally change the nature of the game.90 The rule was narrowly
drawn to proscribe only rackets imparting extra spin, and the qualifying
procedure for rackets not conforming to the face of the rule further
narrowed its breadth. 91 Finally, the court found that the association's
82. 511 F. Supp. 1103 (D. Neb.), aff'd per curiam, 665 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1981).
83. Id. at 1107. The rule provided:
The racket shall consist of a frame and a stringing ...
The frame may be of any material, weight, size or shape ...
The strings must be alternatively interlaced or bonded where they cross and each
string must be connected to the frame.
If there are attachments, they must be used only to prevent wear and tear and must
not alter the flight of the ball.
The density in the centre must be at least equal to the average density of the
stringing ...
The spirit of this rule is to prevent undue spin on the ball that would result in a change
in the character of the game.
The stringing must be made so that the moves between strings will not exceed what is
possible for instance with 18 mains and 18 crosses uniformly spaced and interlaced in a
stringing area of 75 square inches.
Id. at 1111 n.3. The United States Tennis Association, a member of the International Tennis Feder-
ation, also adopted the rule. Id. at 1107.
84. Id. at 1119-21.
85. Id. at 1109 n.2.
86. Id. at 1116.
87. See supra text accompanying note 81.
88. GunterHarz Sports, 511 F. Supp. at 1117.
89. Id. In reaching this decision the court noted that a high degree of deference would be
shown to the judgment of the sanctioning organization. Id.
90. Id. at 1120-21.
91. Id. at 1121.
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procedural safeguards, while not a model of due process, were
adequate. 92
In contrast to this approach, applying the Professional Engineers
rule of reason test to the racket rule would present obvious problems.
The racket rule has a clear anticompetitive effect in prohibiting a manu-
facturer from attempting to market its rackets to professional tennis
players. The rule therefore excludes a potential competitor from a sub-
stantial market.93 On the other side of the Professional Engineers bal-
ance, an economically procompetitive justification for the rule is not
readily apparent.
Preserving the character of the game of tennis as it has always been
played does not increase competition in the economic sense. It might be
a worthwhile goal that a sanctioning and promotional body should ad-
vance. It does not, however, increase economic competition in the sense
of encouraging entrants into the market or lowering prices. 94 The racket
rule has an anticompetitive effect, no apparent economic procompetitive
virtues to balance against it, and would therefore be struck down under a
literal reading of Professional Engineers. This is not the result reached by
the court, nor is it apparent that the Sherman Act was meant to prevent
a recognized sanctioning organization from attempting to preserve the
game of tennis in its traditional form, even if this creates an incidental
restraint of trade.
C. Struggling With the Professional Engineers Approach: Professional
Regulation and Staff Privilege Cases.
With the demise of the professional exemption to the antitrust
laws,95 antitrust suits in the health care area, and, in particular chal-
lenges to the denial of hospital staff privileges, have increased in
number.96 The typical case involves a physician who is refused the privi-
lege to practice at a particular hospital, has his privileges revoked, or fails
to win renewal of his hospital privileges.97 The physician may seek to
redress the injury suffered by resort to the antitrust laws on a theory that
92. Id. at 1121-22.
93. This exclusion will in turn have a considerable impact on the marketability of the rackets to
nonprofessional players.
94. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (requiring economic
procompetitive benefits such as encouraging entry or lower prices).
95. See supra note 20.
96. See Kissam, supra note 34, at 596, 599-600; see also Horan & Nord, Application ofAntitrust
Law to the Health Care Delivery System, 9 CuM. L. REv. 685, 688-700 (1979) (reviewing the status
of the traditional defenses relied on by the health care industry and concluding that the defenses
have received more restrictive application in recent years).
97. See, e.g., Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352, 1356 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
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the refusal to allow him to practice at the hospital effectively reduces
competition in the marketplace and is therefore a restraint of trade
within the purview of section 1 of the Sherman Act.98 The hospital often
defends its decision not to grant privileges on the basis of a concern for
medical quality and the belief that it would be endangered by granting
privileges. 99
The basic conflict in these cases is to "reconcile arguments about
medical quality with arguments about promoting competition."100 The
Professional Engineers decision complicates this problem with its admo-
nition that the only relevant consideration in the rule of reason analysis is
the effect on competition.101 The privilege cases undoubtedly involve re-
straints that have an anticompetitive effect.102 Physicians who are li-
censed to practice medicine are excluded from doing so in a particular
place. Under a literal reading of Professional Engineers, the only valid
justification that can be offered for a staff privilege decision is that it is
procompetitive.10 3 It does not suffice to defend the decision with argu-
ments of "public welfare" or "consumer protection."'04 The language of
Professional Engineers seems to condemn any decision with an "overall
anticompetitive effect" and does not appear to allow for a consideration
of medical quality. Nevertheless, the courts that have considered the de-
nial of staff privileges have universally recognized the validity of a con-
cern for medical quality.105 In fact, they conclude that, absent proof of
an anticompetitive intent, proof that the defendant acted to establish
98. A physician with a practice that requires the use of hospital facilities is precluded from
plying his trade if he is denied hospital privileges. As this eliminates a doctor from the marketplace
and lessens competition among doctors, an antitrust violation may be alleged. In order to meet the
contract or conspiracy requirement of section 1 of the Sherman Act, the party bringing the antitrust
action typically alleges that the hospital and other doctors with staff privileges have entered into a
conspiracy aimed at excluding him. See, e.g., Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 848, 906
(W.D. Pa. 1981).
99. See, e.g., Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352, 1359 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
100. Kissam & Webber, supra note 34, at 602.
101. See supra notes 3, 26-35 and accompanying text.
102. See Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 919 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
103. See Kissam & Webber, supra note 34, at 646. The privilege decision must be "output ex-
panding" rather than "output restricting" in order to pass muster under Professional Engineers. Id.
(citing Elzinga, The Compass of Competition for Professional Services, in REGULATING THE PROFES-
SIONS 107 (R. Blair & S. Rubin eds. 1980)).
104. Id. Similar arguments as to public health and safety were advanced by the National Society
of Professional Engineers in defense of their restrictive canon. See supra notes 21-22 and accompa-
nying text. These were rejected as outside the rule of reason. See supra note 23 and accompanying
text.
105. See, e.g., Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352, 1372 & 1376 (W.D. Pa. 1982);
Williams v. Kleaveland, 534 F. Supp. 912, 919 (W.D. Mich. 1981); Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F,
Supp. 842, 919 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
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high quality standards is a persuasive antitrust defense. 10 6
Several rationales have been advanced by the courts to reconcile this
apparent inconsistency. One way in which courts have attempted to
avoid this dilemma is to declare that an anticompetitive effect does not
necessarily require antitrust condemnation if it is insubstantial. 107 This,
of course, does not square with the suggestion in Professional Engineers
that a net anticompetitive effect will not be tolerated. 08 Illustrative of
this approach is Pontius v. Children's Hospital, 09 where a hospital's deci-
sion not to reappoint a physician to the staff was attacked on antitrust
grounds. The hospital contended that the decision not to reappoint was
based on a number of factors, including incompetence, an excessive mor-
tality rate among patients, unnecessary operations, and an inability to
cooperate with other surgeons and staff."t 0 Giving credence to the no-
tion that an insubstantial anticompetitive effect will not be fatal, the
court stated: "We do not believe that the Sherman Act prevents a hospi-
tal from discharging a physician it believes incompetent regardless of any
collateral effect on 'competition.' "1 The court satisfied itself that the
hospital's reasons were supported by substantial evidence and that the
procedures followed by the hospital in making its determinations were
elaborate." 12
Another method has been employed to reconcile a court's desire to
take account of medical quality concerns with the Professional Engineers
balancing of competitive effects. Under this approach, the court nomi-
nally applies the Professional Engineers test, but attempts to convert the
concern for medical quality into a procompetitive justification. Robinson
v. Magovern," 1 3 which also involved the denial of hospital staff privileges,
is an example of this approach. The court reasoned that the hospital
could properly take medical quality into account in its staffing decisions.
By so doing, the hospital would seek to maintain the highest standards
106. Williams v. Kleaveland, 534 F. Supp. 912, 919 (W.D. Mich. 1981) ("[Iln the absence of an
anticompetitive intent or purpose, proof that Defendants acted for the primary purpose of maintain-
ing high quality care is a persuasive defense to an antitrust claim.").
The defense of maintaining high quality standards has also been recognized in cases challenging
a physician's suspension for misconduct or violating rules intended to protect and benefit the public.
See, e.g., Nara v. American Dental Ass'n, 526 F. Supp. 452, 457 (W.D. Mich. 1981).
107. See, e.g., Kreuzer v. American Academy of Periodontology, 558 F. Supp. 683, 685 (D.D.C.
1983), aff'd in part, rey'd in part, and remanded, 735 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Pontius v. Chil-
dren's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352, 1372 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
108. See supra notes 3, 26-35 and accompanying text.
109. 552 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
110. Id. at 1359.
111. Id. at 1372.
112. Id.
113. 521 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
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and reputation for excellence. The hospital would therefore have en-
hanced its competitive position vis-A-vis other hospitals in the region,
with vigorous competition among hospitals benefitting the public. 1 14
Although this approach is consistent with the language of Profes-
sional Engineers, it requires a straining of reason that conceals the actual
motivation for the result reached. The hospital cases would be far clearer
were the Court to recognize openly the concern for medical quality and
the legitimate business desire to avoid malpractice liability. 15 A court
would then be free to analyze the restraint in question by asking whether
it is intended to effect a legitimate goal, whether it is unreasonably re-
strictive in doing so, and whether adequate procedural safeguards are
provided.1 16 It would no longer be necessary to speculate whether some
conceivable benefit to competition in the overall health care market out-
114. Id. at 919; see also Kissam & Webber, supra note 34, at 646 (privilege decision must be part
of plan to make hospital more competitive with other hospitals in the region); cf Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54 (1977) (increase in interbrand competition can be bal-
anced against decrease in intrabrand competition).
115. Similar issues are raised in a number of cases where a concern for safety and the avoidance
of legal liability are cited as justifications for a restraining practice. In Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp.,
425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970), a manufacturer of cosmetics and beauty
products refused to sell its products to a long-time distributor when it was discovered that the dis-
tributor was reselling the products at retail, to end users, and not solely to professionals. This re-
striction on retail sale was defended on the ground that the products could be dangerous if applied
by nonprofessionals who are not familiar with them. The court stated that whether the manufac-
turer was interested in protecting the public from harm or itself from potential product liability,
either motive would be a sufficient lawful purpose "to which the restriction on resale. . . is reason-
ably ancillary." Id. at 938.
The Court in Professional Engineers cited Wella as a proper application of the rule of reason,
explaining that the marketing restraint was reasonably ancillary to the seller's main purpose and had
no anticompetitive effect. 435 U.S. at 696 n.22 (emphasis added). The assertion that no anticompeti-
tive effect was present is suspect. Several commentators have questioned how the refusal to sell to a
particular distributor and the blanket prohibition on retail sales can be said to have no anticompeti-
tive effect. See Robinson, supra note 4, at 17 n.106; Zelek, supra note 4, at 39. The Wella court
found that a restraint did exist, but was reasonably ancillary to a legitimate purpose. 425 F.2d at
938-39. Cases decided after Professional Engineers have not foreclosed a consideration of safety and
legal liability concerns. See, e.g., Sports Center, Inc. v. Riddell, Inc., 673 F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir.
1982) (marketing restraint not unreasonable because of legitimate business reason for limiting prod-
uct distribution to avoid products liability consequences); see also Neeld v. National Hockey League,
594 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1979) (league by-law making players with only one eye ineligible not
unreasonable because anticompetitive effect is "at most de minimis, . . . and incidental to the pri-
mary purpose of promoting safety"); Taylor, Rule of Reason Cases Since National Society of Profes-
sional Engineers, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 185, 194-95 (1982) ("safety, particularly product safety, is still
considered important in analyzing agreements where the anticompetitive impact of the agreement is
not great").
116. This is essentially the analysis used in the sports association cases. See supra notes 80-81
and accompanying text. It is also essentially a common law ancillary restraint analysis, an approach
suggested as appropriate for many rule of reason cases, see infra notes 130-141 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the importance of procedural safeguards, see Kissam, Antitrust Law and
Professional Behavior, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1, 44 & 58-60 (1983).
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weighs the restrictive effect in a more limited market.117
III. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's unstinting defense of competition in Profes-
sional Engineers and its apparent preclusion of all other factors under the
rule of reason presents troublesome analytical hurdles in cases involving
unique situations, particularly where self-regulating groups and
noneconomic justifications are involved. Despite some of the unrelenting
language found in Professional Engineers, the opinion does present sev-
eral alternative ways by which it could be adapted to special situations.
One of these is found in the Court's continued adherence to the cau-
tionary footnote that first appeared in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.18
In this footnote, the Supreme Court suggested that professions differ
from other business activities and therefore may be subject to a some-
what different antitrust analysis. The Court stated that due to the public
service aspect and other features of the professions, a practice which
would be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in other contexts may
be treated differently." 9 In Professional Engineers, the Court again
117. The areas that this note focuses on are by no means an exhaustive list of the areas where the
Professional Engineers rule of reason may prove troublesome. Another example of a potentially
serious problem is found with municipal zoning regulations. The Supreme Court has held that mu-
nicipalities do not have a blanket exemption from the Sherman Act. See Community Communica-
tions Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 50-51 (1982). Most zoning regulations restrain
competition and have no procompetitive purpose. See Comment, Antitrust and Zoning - How
Much Respect for Local Government?, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 901, 904 (1982). If the municipali-
ties cannot defend a zoning law on the basis of benefit to the community in terms of health, safety,
and welfare-and Professional Engineers seems to say they cannot-it would appear that virtually all
zoning laws are candidates for successful antitrust challenges. See Community Communications Co.,
455 U.S. at 65-66 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Comment, supra, at 908; see also Note, Municipal
Antitrust: An Overview, 60 CH.Q-]KENT L. REv. 349, 372 (1984) ("Under the Rule of Reason mu-
nicipalities will be unable to defend their challenged conduct on the basis of legitimate safety, health,
and welfare considerations.").
118. 421 U.S. 773 (1975); see supra note 20.
119. 421 U.S. at788n.17. Goldfarb involved the setting of a minimum-fee schedule for specified
legal services. Id. at 775. The schedule was published by the Fairfax County Bar Association and
enforced by the Virginia State Bar. Before it would provide financing for a home that Goldfarb had
contracted to buy, the lender required that a title examination be conducted. Only a member of the
Virginia State Bar could legally perform the title examination. Id. When Goldfarb was unable to
find a lawyer who would examine the title for a fee less than that prescribed in the mininum-fee
schedule, he initiated an action alleging price fixing in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id.
at 778.
The Supreme Court held that the minimum-fee schedule "constitute[d] a classic illustration of
price fixing," id. at 783, and rejected an exclusion from antitrust regulation for the learned profes-
sions. Id. at 787. In so doing, the Court left open the possibility that the professions may be subject
to a different antitrust analysis than that imposed on other businesses, because of the public service
aspects and other features of the professions: "It would be unrealistic to view the practice of profes-
sions as interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions
antitrust concepts which orginated in other areas." Id. at 788 n.17.
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adhered to this view,120 although rejecting out of hand the engineers'
claim that public welfare would be endangered by competitive bidding on
engineering work. 121
The precise scope of the Goldfarb footnote is still unclear, particu-
larly with regard to whether an ethical rule with an overall anticompeti-
tive effect is necessarily invalid and whether a court may ever consider
benefits other than increased competition under the rule of reason.' 22
Despite this uncertainty, a number of courts have concluded that the
hospital staff privilege and health care cases provide a proper setting for
invocation of the Goldfarb footnote. 23 In these circumstances, courts
have held that if the rule in question is noncommercial, and is intended
to serve the public, it can survive a challenge under the antitrust laws. ' 24
The fact that the Court is still willing to entertain a somewhat different
antitrust analysis reflecting the special circumstances of the professions
suggests that this approach may also be available to other entities, partic-
ularly where self-regulation is prevalent.
A related possibility is reflected in the Court's use of the language
from older rule of reason cases, particularly Chicago Board of Trade v.
United States.125 Under this often cited formulation of the rule of reason,
it is necessary to analyze "the facts peculiar to the business, the history of
the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed."' 26 This detailed
120. 435 U.S. at 696. The Court continued to adhere to this view in Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348-49 (1982). Maricopa County involved the setting of maxi-
mum physician fees in coordination with an insurance plan. Id. at 335-36. In condemning this
arrangement, the Court noted that it did not involve an ethical norm or public service regulation.
Id. at 349.
121. Id. at 681 (finding that "the asserted defense rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of
the Rule of Reason").
122. It was these concerns that led Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist to concur in the Court's
judgment, but not join the rule of reason section of the Court's opinion in Professional Engineers. Id.
at 699; see supra note 35.
123. See e.g., Kreuzer v. American Academy of Periodontology, 558 F. Supp. 683, 684 (D.D.C,
1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 735 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Pontius v. Chil-
dren's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352, 1376 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
124. See Williams v. Kleaveland, 534 F. Supp. 912, 918 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (quoting Boddicker
v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626, 632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977)).
125. 246 U.S. 231 (1918). In Chicago Board of Trade, a commodity exchange adopted a rule
providing that any trades executed between the close of trading and the opening of the session on the
next business day must be executed at the closing bid price. Id. at 237. The rule was challenged as
an antitrust violation. The Board defended the rule by contending that its purpose was to promote
the convenience of its members by restricting its hours of operation and to break up a monopoly in
grain trade held by four or five warehousemen. Id. The Court upheld the rule, finding that it merely
restricted the period of price-making, applied only to a small amount of grain traded, and helped
improve market conditions by bringing about regular hours, bringing buyers and sellers into more
direct contact, and eliminating the risks of a private market. Id. at 239-41. The Court recognized
the legitimate business need to set hours in which business may be done. Id. at 241.
126. Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692; see Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
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analysis seems to envision more than a simple weighing of competitive
effects. The Court took account of social and business factors other than
increased competition in Chicago Board of Trade. 127 Although the focus
of Chicago Board of Trade was on the restraint's effect on competition,
the Court admonished that "the legality of an agreement can not be de-
termined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains competition."'' 28 In-
stead it is necessary to look into all circumstances of the case including
the history, peculiar business conditions, and purpose of the restraint.129
If the courts are merely to balance competitive effects, it is unclear why
there would be any need to explore the history and purpose of a restraint.
On the other hand, if the courts are still able to explore market condi-
tions, facts peculiar to the business, and the restraint's purpose, then the
rule of reason should retain enough flexibility to accommodate unusual
entities and noncommercial restraints. Perhaps the Court did not intend
to narrow the rule of reason focus to the extent that portions of Profes-
sional Engineers seem to imply.
Another, and perhaps the best, means of alleviating the rigidity of
Professional Engineers can be found in the Court's treatment of the clas-
sic covenant-not-to-compete case, Mitchel v. Reynolds.130 Mitchel in-
volved a promise by the seller of a bakery that he would not compete
with his buyer in the bakery business.131 The covenant was limited in
duration as well as in geographical scope. The Supreme Court cited
Mitchel with approval in Professional Engineers as a proper rule of reason
decision. 132
The Professional Engineers Court conceded that the covenant in
Mitchel had an anticompetitive effect, as it certainly diminished competi-
tion in the bakery business.' 33 The procompetitive justification for the
restraint cited by the Court was its enhancement of the marketability of
the business, thereby providing incentives to develop such an enterprise,
and in the long run benefitting competition. 134 This is an extremely
strained construction of the ancillary restraint doctrine in order to make
it consistent with the competitive balancing approach espoused by
127. 246 U.S. at 239-41; see Casenote, National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 142, 148-50 (1979); supra note 125.
128. 246 U.S. at 238.
129. Id.
130. 1 P. Wrms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711).
131. See Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 688.
132. Id. at 688-89.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 689.
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Professional Engineers.1 35 The long-established method of evaluating a
covenant not to compete is to ask whether it is reasonably necessary to
effect a legitimate transaction.1 36
The Professional Engineers Court thus seemed willing to sanction a
decrease in competition in the bakery market in order to promote larger
business and social goals, and, in effect, acknowledged that free and open
competition among bakers is sometimes less than desirable. t37 This posi-
tion is at odds with other parts of the Professional Engineers opinion,
where any abrogation of free and open competition is condemned. Nev-
ertheless, the ancillary restraint doctrine is a useful one, and is capable of
rectifying most of the problems identified in this note.138
Once it is conceded that a given goal is a legitimate one, the re-
straints imposed to effect it can be assessed in terms of their reasonable
necessity and breadth. This approach would be useful in remedying the
specific problem areas addressed by this note. The initial focus on a
goal's legitimacy is important in order to accommodate the competing
concerns in the antitrust assessment. Our society contains many organi-
zations that do not, and should not, operate solely for commercial pur-
poses. If such organizations are allowed to pursue noncommercial
objectives, these objectives cannot be excluded from consideration when
the organization is subjected to antitrust accusations.' 3 9 At the same
time, an organization pursuing noncommercial objectives can wield con-
siderable economic and commercial power.' 40 The courts must therefore
135. See Handler & Lazaroff, Restraint of Trade and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57
N.Y.U. L. REV. 669, 752-55 (1982). Handler and Lazaroff note that lower courts handling typical
ancillary restraint cases, such as covenants not to compete, have not adopted the Professional Engi-
neers balancing test. They argue, however, that Professional Engineers cramps the analytical frame-
work and that, if rigidly applied, it would negate most ancillary restraints. Id. at 754-55; see also
Robinson, supra note 4, at 17-18 (literal application of Professional Engineers test would call into
question ancillary restraints traditionally sustained as reasonable; attempt to harmonize ancillary
restraint doctrine within narrow Professional Engineers rule of reason "patently forced").
136. See sources cited supra note 135.
137. 435 U.S. at 688-89.
138. Using the ancillary restraint doctrine to assist in the difficult area of applying the antitrust
laws to professional league sports has been suggested. See Bork, Ancillary Restraints and the Sher-
man Act, 15 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. 211, 231 (1959); see also National Football League v. North
Am. Soccer League, 459 U.S. 1074, 1077-78 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of cert.)
(conducting ancillary restraint analysis of league rule prohibiting NFL team owner from owning
controlling interest in NASL team). The notion that the Sherman Act should be applied with refer-
ence to the common-law ancillary restraint doctrine is not novel. See United States v. Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 279-84 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd and modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
139. See Gulland, Byrne & Steinbach, Intercollegiate Athletics and Television Contracts: Beyond
Economic Justifications in Antitrust Analysis of Agreements Among Colleges, 52 FORDHAM L. REV.
717, 729 (1984) (arguing that "noncommercial values must be given weight in analyzing the prac-
tices of noncommercial institutions and organizations that have some commercial consequences").
140. See infra note 154.
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carefully assess the reasonable necessity and breadth of the challenged
restraints. The ancillary restraint doctrine is a vehicle capable of accom-
modating these competing concerns.
It is submitted that an ancillary restraint approach would be prefer-
able to the use of a strained competitive balancing approach in many
situations. It would bring to the forefront the basic concerns and allow a
court to assess them in a straightforward fashion. Analytical clarity and
logical consistency would follow and the danger of mechanical, inflexible
application of the antitrust laws would be lessened. The potential of an
ancillary restraint approach is illustrated in the Court's recent treatment
of television broadcast rules imposed by the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA).141 Although the Supreme Court claimed to follow
the rigid Professional Engineers approach, it nevertheless utilized some of
the aspects of an ancillary restraint analysis.
IV. A CASE STUDY: NCAA v BOARD OF REGENTS
The court of appeals decision in Board of Regents v. NCAA 142 is a
good example of the problems created by a rigid application of Profes-
sional Engineers. NCAA involved a challenge by certain member schools
to the NCAA's football television regulations. 143 The broadcast rules
limited schools to a specified number of television exposures, limited the
total number of televised games, and effectively set the compensation re-
ceived by schools for each appearance. 144 The schools challenging the
regulations sought to invalidate the contracts entered into between the
NCAA and the television networks and become free to strike their own
deal for the sale of broadcast rights to games in which they were to
participate. 145
The district court had held that the NCAA's television regulations
were invalid per se as well as unlawful under the rule of reason,146 and
141. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
142. 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
143. While it was at one time questionable whether the NCAA, as a voluntary, nonprofit organi-
zation whose goals are presumably educational, would be subject to the antitrust laws, this issue is
no longer in doubt. See Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 114849 (5th Cir. 1977) ("The court
holds that the NCAA is not entitled to a total exclusion from antitrust regulations. ... ); see also
NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2954 (1984) (antitrust laws applied to NCAA television
broadcast regulations).
144. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1150, 1152.
145. Id. at 1149.
146. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1311, 1314-15 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd in part and remanded,
707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
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the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.147 The NCAA de-
fended the broadcast rules as necessary to maintain an athletic competi-
tive balance between the schools.1 48 The Tenth Circuit did not believe
that it could take such a justification into account. Rather, it cited Pro-
fessional Engineers for the proposition that "[n]oneconomic considera-
tions, however worthy, cannot be used to justify restraints that adversely
affect competition."1 49
The full ramifications to the NCAA of this assertion can readily be
seen. As the court itself noted, the NCAA is essentially a rulemaking
and rule-enforcing body made up of public and private colleges perform-
ing mostly noncommercial functions.' 50 It was formed in part to "gov-
ern the conduct of its member institutions in the administration of
intercollegiate athletics."151 The NCAA has played a large role in regu-
lating amateur collegiate sports 1 52 It sets eligibility requirements and
playing rules, regulates recruiting, determines the length of the season,
dictates how many games are played, and specifies the number of coaches
a team may have and the number of scholarships a school may offer.' 3
Most, if not all, of these practices can be viewed as restraints of trade.
The NCAA's concern for amateurism and educational goals
purportedly lies behind these regulations.1 54 The Tenth Circuit believed
that Professional Engineers precluded consideration of noneconomic con-
siderations such as education or amateurism. 155 If this chain of reason-
ing is followed, the NCAA would be completely prohibited from
functioning within its legitimate sphere. Any regulation with the slight-
147. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1162. The Supreme Court held that the NCAA's practices were not
illegal per se, NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2960, but affirmed the lower court holding that the practices
violated the rule of reason. Id. at 2971.
148. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1154, 1159.
149. Id. at 1154.
150. Id. at 1153.
151. Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1141 (5th Cir. 1977).
152. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2954.
153. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1153.
154. Although the NCAA is primarily a noncommercial entity, there can be little doubt that
collegiate sports have considerable commercial appeal. The NCAA is likely to respond to any
charge against it by reference to its concern for education and amateurism. Care must be taken to
insure that this concern is not used to defend practices that are, in essence, veiled economic re-
straints. See Weistart, Legal Accountability and the NCAA, 10 J.C. & U.L. 167, 175-80 (1983).
Instructive in this regard is the NCAA Select Committee's statement regarding the appropriate con-
siderations underlying the college football television policy:
The Committee believes that, regardless of the outcome of current litigation pertaining to
the control of televising college football, it is in the decided best interest of intercollegiate
athletics that institutions band together and act in concert in matters of this sort, with the
objective of generating the maximum possible revenues and achieving the maximum bene-
fits for participating schools.
The NCAA News, Oct. 31, 1983, at 12, col. 3.
155. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1154.
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est anticompetitive effect could not be upheld if the only offsetting justifi-
cation is an educational or amateurism concern-concerns that do not
count because they are "noneconomic."
This predicament results from trying to force noncommercial regu-
lations within the Professional Engineers framework that was intended
for the commercial world. For example, suppose the NCAA prohibits
the staging of athletic events during a time period when all of its member
institutions are conducting exams. Two schools may be presented with a
lucrative opportunity to face each other in an athletic competition during
this time period. These schools may decide to challenge the NCAA's
prohibition on antitrust grounds. An anticompetitive effect is apparent,
as output has been restricted. A rigid application of Professional Engi-
neers would require an offsetting procompetitive effect to uphold the rule.
Applying the Tenth Circuit's reasoning, the NCAA's concern for the stu-
dent-athlete's uninterrupted exam period could not be considered be-
cause it is noneconomic.
A literal application of the Professional Engineers approach asks the
wrong questions regarding a regulation of this kind. The inquiry should
focus on the legitimacy of the NCAA's educational goal and whether the
means intended to implement it are both reasonably related to that goal
and not overly restrictive. Conducting a balancing of competitive effects
does not provide any real guidance to a court trying to assess such a
regulation.
The Supreme Court was presented with an opportunity to clarify the
scope of the rule of reason inquiry as applied to noncommercial regula-
tions in NCAA v. Board of Regents.1 56 The drastic possibility suggested
by the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit, that the NCAA may never justify
its practices by reference to noneconomic factors such as amateurism or
educational goals, was probably alleviated by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion. The Court's opinion, however, does not identify how these
noneconomic concerns are to be incorporated into the antitrust analysis,
and ultimately fails to address adequately the role of noneconomic
considerations.
The Supreme Court first rejected the imposition of per se illegal-
ity,' 57 noting that the case involved an industry in which restraints are
"essential if the product is to be available at all."' 58 In other words,
without joint activity and cooperation the product could not be pro-
duced. Further, the Court noted that many of the NCAA's rules were
156. 104 S. Ct. at 2955-57.
157. Id. at 2961.
158. Id.
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aimed at defining the particular product-college or amateur athletics. 159
This required regulations defining the rules of the game and the size of
squads, as well as educational and amateurism rules, such as mandatory
class attendance and the prohibition against athletes receiving compensa-
tion. 160 The Court viewed these regulations as "procompetitive" because
they allowed for a product that might not otherwise be available. 161
The Court then conducted a rule of reason analysis to determine
whether or not the broadcast restraints enhance competition. 62 The
Court agreed with the district court's finding that the television plan re-
strains price and output and therefore has an anticompetitive effect. 163
This placed a heavy burden on the NCAA to establish an affirmative
defense. 164 The Court rejected the NCAA's defense that television re-
strictions were necessary to protect live gate attendance for two reasons.
First, the television plan did not prohibit televised games at the same
time as live events.165 Second, the Court characterized this defense as an
argument that competition is unsuitable for the industry.1 66 Professional
Engineers was cited for its proposition that the rule of reason does not
support a defense based on the unreasonableness of competition itself.167
The Court then turned to the NCAA's defense that the plan was
necessary to maintain a competitive balance among the athletic teams.
The Court agreed that this was a legitimate and important interest, but
concluded that it did not justify the restrictions imposed.' 68 In essence,
the Court found that the television plan was "not even arguably tailored"
to serve the interest of competitive balance and certainly was overbroad
to serve such an interest. 169
The Court purported to retain the rule of reason formulation set out
by Professional Engineers-asking "whether or not the challenged re-
straint enhances competition."'' 70 However, in evaluating the NCAA's
defense that the television rules are needed to maintain competitive bal-
ance among the college teams, the Court came very close to applying the
ancillary restraint test that this note suggests is appropriate for evaluat-
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2962.
163. Id. at 2962-63.
164. Id. at 2967.
165. Id. at 2968.
166. Id. at 2969.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 2969-70.
169. Id. at 2970.
170. Id. at 2962.
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ing the noneconomic restraints of a self-regulatory body. 171 The Court
initially conceded that the NCAA's interest in competitive balance was a
legitimate one.172 It then proceeded to analyze the restraint to determine
whether the television rules were necessary to achieve such a result. 173
After evaluating the facts, the Court rejected the notion that the televi-
sion plan was intended to promote competitive balance. 174 The Court
noted that other methods used by the NCAA to promote amateurism
and athletic balance were better suited to such a task and were "clearly
sufficient" to accomplish it. 175 Further, other NCAA sports, including
college basketball, were able to maintain competitive balance without a
restrictive television plan.176 The Supreme Court assessed the legitimacy
of the activity, whether the restraint imposed was reasonably necessary,
and whether it was overbroad.
In the section of the Court's opinion that is crucial for determining
how other NCAA noneconomic regulations should be evaluated in the
future, the Court stated that it is "reasonable to assume that most of the
regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering com-
petition among amateur athletic teams and therefore procompetitive be-
cause they enhance public interest in intercollegiate athletics."' 177 The
Court referred to its reasons for refusing to apply the per se rule' 7 8-the
need for cooperative activity and rules in order to create the product-as
valid considerations in the rule of reason analysis. 179 The television
broadcast restraints, however, were said not to "fit into the same mold as
do rules defining the conditions of the contest, the eligibility of partici-
pants, or the manner in which members of a joint enterprise shall share
the responsibilities and the benefits of the total venture."' 180
The Court's discussion suggests several important points. The court
of appeals' argument that noneconomic justifications can never be con-
sidered' 8 1 can no longer be viewed as an absolute. The Supreme Court
recognized the legitimacy of a concern for athletic balance and for regu-
lations necessary to define a product requiring a cooperative undertak-
171. See supra notes 116, 130-41 and accompanying text.
172. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2969.
173. Id. at 2969-70.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2969.
178. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
179. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2969.
180. Id.
181. See NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1154.
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ing. 182 Although it did not explain how such concerns should be
evaluated, the Court's opinion provides language sufficient to dispel the
notion that these concerns are never cognizable. 183
Nevertheless, the Court's opinion fails to provide useful guidance
for assessing noneconomic justifications. The Court held unlawful the
NCAA's very restrictive television broadcast rules, an obviously com-
mercial restraint, but appeared willing to sanction all of the NCAA's
regulatory controls intended to foster amateurism. The Court's state-
ment that it is "reasonable to assume" that most of the NCAA's regula-
tory controls are justifiable is a particularly troublesome assertion. 184
The examples used by the Court as appropriate instances of NCAA con-
duct are broad and provide no inherent limitations. These examples in-
clude defining the conditions of the contest, the eligibility of participants,
or the manner in which members of the joint enterprise share the respon-
sibilities and benefits. 185 The NCAA can be expected to assert this type
of justification for any of its practices that are challenged.
The danger of upholding any rule that arguably promotes amateur-
ism because of the legitimate regulatory role of the NCAA is exemplified
by the dissent in NCAA. Justice White's dissent emphasized the
noneconomic nature of the NCAA's self-regulation. He noted that the
Sherman Act was aimed at activities of a commercial nature and believed
that the nonprofit aspect of the NCAA and the noneconomic nature of
the goals it was pursuing argued for different treatment. 186 Justice White
asserted that Professional Engineers' mandate to focus solely on competi-
tion was applicable only to "profit-motivated commercial activities." 187
He did not believe that Professional Engineers precluded consideration of
182. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2969. One point that merits further emphasis in analyzing the decision
in NCAA is the majority's treatment of the NCAA's need for cooperative activity and joint rulemak-
ing in order to produce the product. This factor is cited as a ground for refusing to apply the per se
rule, id. at 2961-62, and is the reason given by the Court for its statement that it is "reasonable to
assume" that most of the NCAA's regulations are justifiable. Id. at 2969. The need for cooperative
activity could just as easily be characterized as an argument that competition is undesirable because
of special industry characteristics. This illustrates that a court's characterization ofa proferredjusti-
fication as an argument that "competition is undesirable" is a chameleon-like response-one that can
change to fit the needs of the proponent.
183. See Justice White's dissent, stating that the "legitimate noneconomic goals of colleges and
universities should not be ignored in analyzing restraints," noting that the court of appeals "flatly
refused to consider" such justifications, and stating that at least the Supreme Court did not "in so
many words repeat this error." NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2978 (White, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 2969.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 2978 (White, J., dissenting).
187. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
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noneconomic values.""' Justice White's attempt to factor the
noneconomic values into the balance is very problematic. He summarily
concluded that the television plan "seems eminently reasonable" when
these values are considered.189 This conclusion was apparently premised
on the fact that spreading revenue among the schools fosters amateurism
and competitive balance. 190 No attempt was made to determine if the
television plan was necessary to accomplish these goals, whether less re-
strictive means were available, or whether the television plan was
broader than it had to be. Instead the dissent accepted the NCAA's jus-
tification without rigorous analysis.
By continuing to adhere to the competitive balancing approach es-
poused by Professional Engineers, the Court did little to promote clarity
of analysis in the future. On the one hand, the Court continued to re-
quire that a challenged restraint be on balance "procompetitive."' 191 On
the other hand, the Court appeared willing to assume the legitimacy of
most NCAA regulations because they help to define and make possible
the product. 192 When faced with an NCAA regulation that has more
than a trivial anticompetitive effect, but which could also be justified as
helping to define and make possible the product of amateur athletics, the
lower courts will find little guidance in NCAA or Professional Engi-
neers.193 These cases are unlikely to be the last words on how
noneconomic concerns should fit into the rule of reason.
V. CONCLUSION
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States 194 the
Supreme Court undertook a review and restatement of the rule of reason.
The approach taken by the Court eliminated much of the flexibility tradi-
tionally associated with the rule of reason, making its application difficult
in unique situations. Although parts of the opinion enunciate a very
rigid rule of reason, the Court left open several avenues that are capable
of restoring the necessary flexibility. The Court's reference to the com-
mon-law ancillary restraint doctrine is a particularly promising means of
188. Id. (White, J., dissenting); see also Gulland, Byrne & Steinbach, supra note 139, at 727-29
(arguing that Professional Engineers' focus on economic competition and its preclusion of
noneconomic factors was only meant to apply to for-profit businesses).
189. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2978 (White, J., dissenting).
190. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 2962.
192. Id. at 2968-69.
193. See Gulland, Byrne & Steinbach, supra note 139, at 729 ("The insistence on conducting an
analysis of college athletic regulations solely in the cant of economic antitrust analysis produces
incongruous statements and murky thinking clothed with the false precision of jargon.").
194. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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accommodating the antitrust laws to unique situations. The Court took
steps towards employing such an analysis in NCAA v. Board of Re-
gents,195 but also purported to adhere to the narrow formulation of Pro-
fessional Engineers. A more satisfying approach to the rule of reason
would result if the Court were to adopt explicitly the alternatives sug-
gested in Professional Engineers.
Barry Wertheimer
195. 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
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